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Trade Regulation-1961 Tennessee Survey (II)
Leo I. Raskind*
I. BPEQUiEVNTS CONTBACrS UNDER SECMON 3 OF THE CLAYTON Acr
II. AcrIoNs FOR TmoxLE DAmAGEs-PRVATE ACIONS UNDER PUBLIC LAW
III. TRADE NAmxs UNDER TENNESSEE LAW
This field of law, not previously treated independently in the annual
survey, is designated as Trade Regulation or alternatively as Government
or Public Control of Business. In the limit, this body of doctrine is an
amalgam of tort and contract principles bearing the impress of the equity
practice. These distinct principles are now embodied in both state and
federal statutes as the foundations of legal control over competitive com-
mercial conduct.1 Their scope extends, with different emphasis, from
public utility rate regulation to a variety of aspects of market structure
and conduct in the unregulated sector of the economy. The principal stuff
of which its lawsuits are made includes pricing practices (price-fixing or
discriminatory pricing) and other forms of collusive behavior, exclusive
dealing arrangements, tying arrangements, mergers, trademark protection,
and unfair competition.
The decided cases within the period of this survey touch only a few of
these topics.
I. REQuRmEmENTs CoNT Acrs UNDER SECTION 3 OF TBE CLAYTON AcT
In Tampa Electric Co. v. Nashville Coal Co.,2 the Supreme Court had
before it a requirements contract which had been held illegal both by the
United States District Court for the Middle District of Tennessee and the
Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit.3 Justice Clark's opinion reversing
the lower courts announced an important departure in the judicial con-
struction of section 3.
It is standard practice in the commerce of production and distribution
for a seller to enter into a contract conditioning the sale (or lease) of
goods and commodities on the buyer's (or lessee's) promise not to handle
*Associate Professor of Law, Vanderbilt University.
1. See TENN. CODE ANN. §§ 69-101-519 (Supp. 1961) and the federal statutes cited
infra.
2. 365 U.S. 320 (1961). The case is again before the district court for a determina-
tion of damages.
3. 168 F. Supp. 456 (M.D. Tenn. 1958), aft'd, 276 F.2d 766 (6th Cir. 1960).
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the wares of any competing supplier. These arrangements are known as
exclusive dealerships or exclusive arrangements. Two variants of such
exclusive dealership contracts are recognized. The requirements contract
is one which obligates the buyer to purchase all of his needs of a given
commodity, such as iron ore or coal, from the contracting seller. Another
variant is the tying contract which obligates the buyer to purchase an
ordinary fungible good in order to acquire some patented or distinctive
commodity of which the seller is the sole or principal source. All such
agreements are within the purview of section 3 of the Clayton Act which
makes it unlawful
for any person .. .to lease .. .or contract for sale of goods .. .or other
commodities on the condition [that the] purchaser shall not use or deal in
the goods . . . or other commodities of a competitor or competitors of the
lessor or seller, where the effect of such .. .contract may be to substantially
lessen competition or tend to create a monopoly in any line of commerce.
4
The last clause, dealing with the effect of the agreement on the competitive
process, is central to the construction of this provision.
Enacted in response to dissatisfaction with judicial construction of the
Sherman Act as a means of policing the channels of distribution, section
3 was not conceived as an absolute bar to the exclusive arrangements.5
As the report of the Attorney General's Committee recognizes, such ar-
rangements may have merit in promoting competition as well as in im-
peding it.6
Historically, section 3 was applied to situations where the dominant
seller of a given commodity entered into widespread exclusive arrange-
ments.7 From a Supreme Court opinion involving a tying arrangement, the
doctrine emerged that a seller who utilized tying arrangements involving
"a not insubstantial" amount of commerce would be held to have violated
section 3 without more.8 Subsequently the controversial opinion in Stand-
ard Oil Co. v. United States (commonly referred to as Standard Stations)
announced the proposition that this construction of the language of section
3 might be applied to a requirements contract as well.9 This arose as
follows: In the government's suit against the Standard Oil Company of
California, evidence was introduced to prove that Standard, which sold
4. 38 Stat. 731 (1944), as amended, 15 U.S.C. § 14 (1958).
5. See Whitwell v. Continental Tobacco Co., 125 Fed. 454 (8th Cir. 1903); 51
CONG. REc. 15637-40 (1914).
6. REP RT OF =x ATToRNEY GExNERAs's COMMI E To STUDY THE ANTITRUST LAWS
145 (1955); Note, Restricted Channels of Distribution Under the Sherman Act, 75
HI- v. L. Rxv. 795 (1962).
7. Penick & Ford, Ltd., 14 F.T.C. 261 (1930); Carter Carburetor Corp., 28 F.T.C.
116 (1939).
8. International Salt Co. v. United States, 332 U.S. 392 (1947). See Turner, The
Validity of Tying Arrangements Under the Antitrust Laws, 72 HAv. L. Rxv. 50 (1958).
9. 337 U.S. 293 (1949).
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23% of the total taxable gasoline gallonage in seven western states, had
entered into requirements contracts covering 16% of the retail gasoline
outlets in those states, and that 6.7% of the retail gasoline sold in this
region was sold by dealers who were parties to such arrangements with
Standard. On the trial the district judge refused to admit evidence
offered by Standard to show that these contracts were economically bene-
ficial and did not restrain competition.' 0 On appeal to the Supreme Court,
Mr. Justice Frankfurter, writing for a majority of five, applied the spirit of
the strict tying arrangement construction to section 3, concluding that even
though such contracts could be beneficial, a court was bound to infer
illegality if the contract covered a substantial amount of commerce. Prior
to the Tampa Electric opinion, this principle of quantitative substantiality
enjoyed an uneasy dominance."
The facts in the Tampa Electric case are of classic simplicity. A seller
repudiated a twenty-year requirements contract for bituminous coal,
characterizing it as illegal.' 2 In the subsequent suit for a declaratory
10. United States v. Standard Oil Co., 78 F. Supp. 850 (S.D. Cal. 1948).
11. The extensive criticism of the commentators can be grouped under two headings:
criticism of the harshness and inflexibility of the rule, and criticism of the ambiguity of
quantitative substantiality as a standard. Under the first heading, see Lockhart &
Sacks, The Relevance of Economic Factors in Determining Whether Exclusive Arrange-
ments Violate Section 3 of the Clayton Act, 65 HAuv. L. Rv. 913 (1952); Sunderland,
Changing Legal Concepts in the Antitrust Field, 3 SYRAcusE. L. REv. 60, 80 (1951);
Oppenheim, Federal Antitrust Legislation: Guideposts to a Revised National Antitrust
Policy, 50 MicH. L. 11Ev. 1139, 1180 (1952); Schwartz, Potential Impairment of
Competition-The Impact of Standard Oil Co. of California v. United States on the
Standard of Legality Under the Clayton Act, 98 U. PA. L. REv. 10 (1949); KAYSF_N
& TuRNEa, AN-rruST PoLic- 159 (1959). Under the second heading see Kessler &
Stem, Competition, Contract, and Vertical Integration, 69 YALE L.J. 1, 30-31 (1959).
Judicial response to the Standard Stations decision reflected a diversity of interpreta-
tions. Some courts followed it literally, e.g., Red Rock Cola Co. v. Red Rock Bottlers,
Inc., 1952-53 CCH Trade Cas. 11 67375; other courts tended to give it relatively little
weight, United States v. American Can Co., 87 F. Supp. 18 (N.D. Cal. 1949). Still
other courts accepted part and rejected part, Puett Elec. Starting Gate Corp. v.
Harford Agricultural & Breeders Ass'n, 1950-51 CCH Trade Cas. ff 62570; Dictograph
Prods. v. FTC, 217 F.2d 821 (2d Cir. 1954), cert. denied, 349 U.S. 940 (1955).
Another aspect of the uncertainty surrounding the Standard Stations doctrine was
reflected in the way the Federal Trade Commission alternately blew hot and cold
towards it. At first, the Commission considered itself bound by this opinion. See
Horlicks Corp., 47 F.T.C. 169 (1950); Underwood Corp., 49 F.T.C. 1123 (1953). In
1954, the Commission rejected this position by overruling a hearing examiner who
had relied upon the Standard Stations case to exclude evidence offered to prove that
competition had increased despite the exclusive arrangements. Maico Co., 50 F.T.C.
485 (1953); Maico Co., 51 F.T.C. 1197 (1955) (consent order). See also HAm)LE,
ANrMUST nI PERSPECTIVE 124-26 (1957).
Until 1960 the Commission followed the Maico path, admitting evidence on all
relevant variables in addition to substantiality. See Anchor Serum Co. v. FTC, 217
F.2d 867 (7th Cir. 1954); Revlon Prods. Corp., 51 FTC 260 (1954); Outboard Marine
& Mfg. Co., 52 F.T.C. 1553 (1956). In 1960 the Commission returned to the
Standard Stations doctrine, announcing the- shift in Mytinger & Casselberry, 1960-61
TRADE REG. REP. 11 29091.
12. The original contract was a twenty-year agreement to provide, coal for its new
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judgment on that issue, the seller asserted the illegality and unenforcibility
of the contract under section 3 of the Clayton Act and sections 1 and 2
of the Sherman Act.13 The repudiating seller prevailed. Both lower courts,
applying the controlling doctrine established a dozen years earlier in the
controversial Standard Stations opinion of Mr. Justice Frankfurter, held
section 3 of the Clayton Act to be violated by a showing that this require-
ments contract covered a substantial segment of interstate commerce and
accordingly drew the traditional inference that its effect was to violate
section 3.14
In granting the defendant's motion for summary judgment, the district
court viewed the agreement as a total requirements contract of such mag-
nitude in tonnage terms that, by comparison with the existing annual coal
consumption for the entire state of Florida, it covered "manifestly a large
and substantial volume of commerce for a period of 20 years." 15 The district
court followed the inner logic of the Standard Stations doctrine to its in-
exorable conclusion that this contract, which would "pre-empt" or "engross"
such a substantial quantum of commerce from the competitors of the
contracting seller, left "no escape from the conclusion that its effect, under
the circumstances disclosed is to 'probably lessen competition, or create an
actual tendency to monopoly.""16
The Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit affirmed, Judge Weick
dissenting.17 The two judge majority remained within the rubric of the
Standard Stations doctrine, finding the necessary substantiality both in the
tonnage and in the dollar terms of the contract.18 The sole dissenter was
unable to view the Standard Stations doctrine as dispositive. Judge Weicek's
opinion presaged, in part, the Supreme Court's view of the case. For, like
Justice Clark, he noted the special circumstances of the buyer's status as a
steam generating plant, the Gannon Station. On May 23, 1955, the original signatories
were Tampa Electric (buyer) and the Potter Towing Company, a Tennessee partner-
ship of David K. Wilson and Justin Potter (seller). Subsequently the partnership
interest in this contract was transferred to Nashville Coal, Inc., a subsidiary of West
Kentucky Coal Company. According to the contract, seller was to supply the total
requirements of fuel at the Gannon Station, deliveries to start about March 1957. Brief
for Appellant in the Court of Appeals, pp. 9a-10a (appendix). In April, 1957 just
prior to the first delivery of coal, the seller advised Tampa Electric that no coal would
be delivered at the contract price; the seller asserted the illegality of the contract under
section 3. In August, Tampa Electric entered into a covering agreement with the
Love and Amos Coal Company by purchase order, an arrangement which was converted
to a four-year requirements contract cancellable on an annual basis. Appellant's Brief
in the Court of Appeals, pp. 35a-36a (appendix). The Sherman Act issue was not
reached.
13. 26 Stat. 209 (1890), as amended, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1, 2 (1958).
14. See note 3 supra.
15. 168 F. Supp. at 459.
16. Id. at 461.
17. Tampa Elec. Co. v. Nashville Coal Co., 276 F.2d 766, 774 (6th Cir. 1960).
18. Id. at 771.
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regulated public utility and recognized its correlative requirement of an
ample and certain supply of fuel at a known price.19 In the remainder of
the dissent, Judge Weick departed from all his judicial brethren who con-
sidered this case by expressing two principal points of difference with the
majority and with the lower court.
First, he noted the troublesome aspect of the assertion of illegality
stemming from the repudiating seller. Judge Weick would have refused
the seller's plea of his own violation of the antitrust laws as a release from
his contractual obligation.20 Second, he found that the appropriate line of
commerce was not coal, as the district court and the majority had assumed
without discussion, but rather boiler fuels including coal, fuel oil, gas, and
atomic energy. Viewed in this broader commercial context, he concluded
that the contract fell below the test of substantiality within the meaning of
the Standard Stations doctrine.
In contrast to the lower courts, the Supreme Court opinion applied a
construction of section 3 that materially altered the relevant criteria for
the determination of the legality of a requirements contract under section
3. Without overruling the doctrine of Standard Stations, Justice Clark,
writing for a majority of seven justices, announced an approach that
negated the basic premise of the Standard Stations opinion.2 In effect,
Justice Clark returned to the fundamental dichotomy posed by Justice
Frankfurter earlier, and chose the opposite alternative. 2 While Justice
Frankfurter arrived at the principle of quantitative substantiality by clearly
rejecting an economic inquiry to prove the actual or substantial diminution
of competitive activity in the construction of section 3, Justice Clark
announced a list of variables framing the effect of the contract on com-
petition as the ultimate issue under section 3. Under the Standard Stations
opinion, proof that the basic agreement accounted for a substantial segment
of interstate commerce was the dispositive issue. Given this finding of
substantiality, further proof of the effect on competition was foreclosed by
the inference that the forbidden slackening of competitive activity would
necessarily follow.23 For Justice Frankfurter, any alternative to this process
of inference from the finding of substantiality was to embrace a "standard
of proof, if not virtually impossible to meet, at least most ill-suited for
19. Id. at 776.
20. Kelly v. Kosuga, 358 U.S. 516 (1959) was decided subsequent to the district
court's decision.
21. See note 2 supra.
22. While the approach of Justice Clark's opinion does, in part, parallel the reasoning
of Justice Jackson's dissent in the Standard Stations case, it is closer to the rejected
alternative of Mr. Justice Frankfurters majority opinion. See 337, U.S. at 321.
23. "[T]he showing that Standards requirements contracts affected a gross business
of $58,000,000 comprising 6.7% of the total in the area goes far toward supporting




ascertainment by courts,"2 4 Indeed, he saw an element of perversity in
such a reading of the statute. To insist upon such an investigation would
be to stultify the force of the congressional declaration that requirements
contracts are to be prohibited whenever their effect may be to lessen
competitionP
The extent of the disagreement between the opinions in these two
cases over the ultimate question of section 3 is reflected in the factors
which each Justice would weigh. Justice Frankfurter, expatiating upon
the implications of his standard, mapped the terrain of proof which would
be irrelevant thereunder. Accordingly he banished from consideration
"evidence that competition has flourished despite use of the contracts . ..,
the conformity of the length of .. . [the contract] term . . . . the status
of the defendant as a struggling newcomer or an established competitor,
* . . [and] the defendant's degree of market control . . . ."2 In contrast,
Justice Clark announced at the outset that substantiality of commerce
covered by the contract at issue, at least when measured in terms of the
dollar value of the contract, does not rise above the level of an incidental
fact. This mode of substantiality he minimized as "ordinarily of little
consequence."27 Instead, Justice Clark, applying a statutory standard
concerned with proof of the actual or potential lessening of competitive
activity, returned to relevance some of the evidentiary matter previously
dismissed by Justice Frankfurter.
For his construction of section 3 and its concomitant emphasis upon the
slackening of competitive vigor, Justice Clark utilized a somewhat familiar
list of variables. Courts (and perhaps the Commission)2 are henceforth
to weigh the effects of requirements contracts on the qualifying clause of
section 3 by "taking into account the relative strength of the parties, the
proportionate volume of commerce involved in relation to the total volume
of commerce . . . , and the probable and immediate future effects which
pre-emption of that share of the market might have on effective com-
petition therein."29 Further, the scope of inquiry into the lessening of
competition is to include evidence of "particularized considerations of the
parties' operations . . ."30
Justice Clark found grounds for reversal in the failure of the lower
court to define properly the relevant competitive market area within
which this anti-competitive effect could be determined. 31 Assuming, with-
24. 337 U.S. at 310.
25. Id. at 311.
26. Id. at 308.
27. 365 U.S. at 329.
28. See note 11 supra.
29. 365 U.S. at 329.
30. Id. at 335.
31. "In applying these considerations to the facts of the case . . . it appears clear
that both the Court of Appeals and the District Court have not given the required
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out deciding, that the relevant product would be bituminous coal, Justice
Clark rejected as invalid the lower court's finding of substantiality of the
competitive restraint from the mere comparison between the annual
tonnage of coal under the contract and the total consumption of coal
recorded for peninsular Florida.33 In general terms, Justice Clark's defi-
nition of the appropriate market area was phrased as "the market area in
which the seller operates, and to which the purchaser can practicably
turn for supplies."33 Applying this test, the market area was identified by
the Court as the entire Appalachian area.34 Thus viewed, the Tampa Elec-
tric contract did not "substantially foreclose competition" and moreover,
it afforded lawful economic benefits to the buyer.3 5
The full import of this construction of section 3 remains uncertain.
On its face the Tampa Electric opinion undercuts both the letter and
spirit of quantitative substantiality as a reigning principle. As Milton
effect to a controlling factor in the case-the relevant competitive market area. This
omission, by itself, requires reversal, for, as we have pointed out, the relevant market
is the prime factor in relation to which the ultimate question, whether the contract
forecloses competition .. .. must be decided." 365 U.S. at 329.
32. "We do not believe that the pie will slice so thinly." 365 U.S. at 331.
33. Id. at 327.
34. The Supreme Court, like the district court, accepted Tampa's uncontroverted
assertion that the seller was but one of 700 coal producers who could have furnished
plaintiff's requirements. Brief for Petitioner in the Supreme Court, pp. 38-42. The
accuracy of the number of possible competitors was not challenged by the seller.
Indeed the existence of "a multitude of eager sellers" and "the fierce intensity of
competition" conformed to the seller's theory of the case that the contract was unlaw-
ful "because it excludes all competitors from access to the coal business involved."
See Defendant's Reply Memorandum on the Motion and Cross-Motion for Summary
Judgment, pp. 16-17, n.14.
The Supreme Court identified the area of effective competition as at least a seven-
state region composed of coal producing districts in West Virginia, Virginia, Kentucky,
Tennessee, North Carolina, Alabama, and Georgia (365 U.S. at 333 n.15). The
Court noted, however, that coal suitable for Tampa's requirements was also available
in Pennsylvania, Ohio, and Illinois (365 U.S. at 333).
One commentator has criticized the Court's acceptance of "the statement in Tampa's
brief that the 700 producers were located in certain officially defined coal districts
.... " The Supreme Court, 1960 Term, 75 HLrv. L. REv. 80, 205-06 (1961). Pre-
sumably, the sole authority for so locating these coal producers is the statement in the
Brief for Petitioner in the Supreme Court, p. 42 n.24. This is a reference to a report
of the U.S. Bureau of the Census of Mineral Industries for 1954, followed by the
statement: "These 700 producers are located in Districts 1-4, 6-11, and 13. . . . The
states included in these districts are principally Alabama, Tennessee, Kentucky, Virginia,
West Virginia, Pennsylvania, Ohio, Indiana, and Illinois."
This identification of the market area solely by reference to the producing area is
at variance with one method of marketing bituminous coal-the use of a sales agency
located in the northeastern seaboard area. Cf. Appalachian Coals, Inc. v. United
States, 288 U.S. 344 (1933); 1 Wnrn=, ANTRrusT PoIrcIEs 409 (1958). By
implementing its own definition of the relevant market in a less than precise manner,
the Court has limited the applicability of its announced departure from the prior rule.
See Bok, The Tampa Electric Case and the Problem of Exclusive Arrangements Under
The Clayton Act, in ThE Su, ~mE COURT tzvniw 267, 283-85 (Kurland ed. 1961).
35. 365 U.S. at 334-35.
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Handler has put it, "what Mr. Justice Clark . . . did to Standard Stations
is as neat a piece of judicial surgery as has been seen in some time."36
This view seems overly optimistic. Perhaps it is the surgical reference
and its connotation (at least to the nonsurgeon) of precision that is un-
warranted. For, like its predecessor doctrine of quantitative substantiality,
the new Tampa Electric principle leaves room for further clarification. At
least two aspects of the Tampa Electric opinion heighten the margin of
conjecture over the extent to which it has superseded the earlier doctrine.
First, taking the opinion on its narrowest grounds, the rejection, of
quantitative substantiality is not absolute. Only quantitative substantiality
in money terms is dismissed. But even this is qualified by the statement
that it is "ordinarily of little consequence."37 If ordinarily is construed
to incorporate the factual pattern of the case, including the buyers' par-
ticular needs as a regulated public utility, the Standard Stations doctrine
may yet reign in the unregulated sector. A second factor in the uncertainty
of the scope of the Tampa Electric opinion stems from its precise grounds
of reversal-the improper definition of the relevant market area of com-
petition.18 This narrow basis of reversible error may relegate the new list
of evidentiary variables to the status of surplus language. For in terms of
the Court's definition of the relevant market, the quantum of trade would
probably have been insubstantial in terms of the Standard Stations doctrine.
Finally, the new variables themselves raise independent grounds for con-
jecture as they are couched in language of broad sweep. Such phrases as
"the relative strength of the parties" and "the probable immediate and
future effects which pre-emption of that share of the market might have
on effective competition," hold limited promise for immediate definition.
Moreover, there is danger that a vague standard will lead to a quest for
the unsatisfactory certainty of the Standard Stations doctrine.3
On balance, it is clear that this opinion constitutes Supreme Court
dissatisfaction with the Standard Stations rule. Yet, the new doctrine has
its own congenital limitations.40 As it stands, the Tampa Electric principle
in its factual context emerges as an announcement of departure from the
inflexibility of the prior rule. This opinion is thus no more than an ex-
36. Handler, Recent Antitrust Developments, 71 YALE L.J. 75, 82 (1961).
37. See note 27 supra.
38. See note 31 supra.
39. See note 11 supra.
40. Recent statements, if accurate, underscore one basis for the traditional judicial
hostility to a contracting party's allegation of the illegality of the agreement. It has
been said that Cyrus Eaton was the moving spirit behind both the Nashville Coal
Company and Tampa Electric, respectively the seller and buyer in this case. Further,
there is the suggestion of a tangled web of relationships across union-management
lines, involving Eaton and John L. Lewis in an attempt to gain control of the bitumi-
nous coal industry. See Caldwell & Graham, The Strange Romance Between John L.
Lewis and Cyrus Eaton, Harpers, Dec. 1961, pp. 25, 28-29, 32.
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pression of a preference for a wider perspective in the construction of
section 3. It does not entirely supplant the prior doctrine. Quantitative
substantiality has not been dismissed from service; it appears merely, with
uncertain effect, to have been reduced in rank.
II. AcTioNs FOR TREBLE DAIAGEs-PivATE AMTONS UNDER PuBuLC LAw
The Clayton Act4 ' is unique insofar as it provides for a private cause
of action in a federal court, thereby adding the pressure of private suits
to the Government's enforcement program. Under section 4 of the Clayton
Act, any person "injured in his business or property by reason of anything
forbidden in the antitrust laws," is entitled to recover "threefold the
damages by him sustained," plus costs including a reasonable attorney's
fee.42 Ordinarily, the private suit is brought subsequent to the victory of
the Government against the defendant so that the private suitor can, under
section 5 of the Clayton Act, ease his burden of proving the antitrust
violation by docketing a copy of the Government's judgment or decree.
With the proof of the public injury thus minimized, the bulk of treble
damage actions are suits concerned with the measure of plaintiffs damages.4 3
As under other branches of the law, the successful treble damages
plaintiff must prove that his injury and resultant damages were caused by
the unlawful acts of the defendant. In suits against Sherman Act violators,
recovery rests upon linking the loss of sales revenues and customer patron-
age with the illegal acts of the violator. By comparison, this problem of
establishing the causal relationship between the plaintiff's injury and the
violator's conduct is more complicated in cases based on a violation of
section 2 of the Clayton Act. For here the plaintiff must prove that his
losses are due to the defendant's granting of a discriminatory price differ-
ential which favors only his competitors. This increases the difficulty of
proving the causal connection because the violator's act is not one directly
41. Section 7 of the Sherman Act as amended by section 4 of the Clayton Act
provides as follows: "Any person who shall be injured in his business or property by
reason of anything forbidden in the antitrust laws may sue therefor in any district
court of the United States in the district in which the defendant resides or is found
or has an agent, without respect to the amount in controversy, and shall recover
threefold the damages by him sustained, and the cost of suit, including a reasonable
attorney's fee." 26 Stat. 210 (1890), 38 Stat. 731 (1914), 15 U.S.C. § 15 (1958).
42. Ibid.
43. Section 5 (a) provides in part: "A final judgment or decree heretofore or here-
after rendered in any civil or criminal proceeding brought by or on behalf of the
United States under the antitrust laws to the effect that a defendant has violated said
laws shall be prima facie evidence against such defendant in any action or proceeding
brought by any other party against such defendant under said laws . . . as to all
matters respecting which said judgment or decree would be an estoppel as between the
parties thereto: Provided, That this section shall not apply to consent judgments or
decrees entered before any testimony has been taken ..... 38 Stat. 731 (1914), 15
U.S.C. § 16 (1958).
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against the plaintiff; the injury stems from the conduct of another, the
competitor more favorably treated by the defendant.44
In Kidd v. Esso Standard Oil Co.,4 5 the Court of Appeals for the Sixth
Circuit considered an appeal by a filling station operator who had lost
his suit for treble damages against his distributor-oil company alleging a
violation of section 2 of the Clayton Act as amended.4 6 Below, the plain-
tiff-appellant's case had foundered on the issue of causation. The jury
found that although the plaintiff was in competition with the favored com-
petitors, and that the defendant's grant of a discount of a fraction of a cent
per gallon to his competitors was discriminatory within the meaning of the
statute, he had suffered no damages as "the direct and proximate result of
the violation by the defendant of Section 13(b)."47
In affirming, the court of appeals followed settled doctrine in finding
a fatal deficiency in the lack of any evidence of the actual lowering of
prices by the favored competitors, or any evidence tending to show the
loss of customers or profits by the plaintiff. The appellate court reiterated
the familiar principle that the plaintiff's right to recovery is limited to such
damages as can be proven with reasonable certainty by the evidence, and
that speculative, remote, or uncertain damages are not allowed.
III. TRADE NmvEs UNDER TENNESSEE LAW
In McDonald v. Julian,48 the Court of Appeals for the Middle Section of
44. Clark, The Treble Damage Bonanza: New Doctrines of Damages in Private
Antitrust Suits, 52 Micn. L. Rzv. 363, 393-94 (1954); see also Comment, 61 YALE L.J.
1010, 1022 (1950); Donovan & Irvine, Proof of Damages Under the Antitrust Law,
88 U. PA. L. REv. 511 (1940); Bigelow v. Radio Pictures, Inc., 327 U.S. 251
(1946); American Can Co. v. Russellville Canning Co., 191 F.2d 38 (8th Cir. 1951);
American Can Co. v. Bruce's Juices Inc., 187 F.2d 919 (5th Cir. 1951), rehearing
denied, 190 F.2d 73 (5th Cir. 1951), petition for cert. dismissed, 342 U.S. 875 (1951);
see also Rowe, Price Differentials and Product Differentiation: The Issues Under the
Robinson-Patman Act, 66 YALE L.J. 1 (1956).
45. 295 F.2d 497 (6th Cir. 1961).
46. Section 2(a), popularly known as the Robinson-Patman Price Antidiscrimination
Act, provides in part: "It shall be unlawful for any person engaged in commerce, in
the course of such commerce, either directly or indirectly to discriminate in price be-
tween different purchasers of commodities of like grade and quality .... where the
effect of such discrimination may be substantially to lessen competition or tend to
create a monopoly in any line of commerce, or to injure, destroy, or prevent competition
with any person who either grants or knowingly receives the benefit of such discrim-
ination, or with customers of either of them .... 38 Stat. 730 (1914), 15 U.S.C. §
13(a) (1958).
Section 2(b) provides in part: "ENjothing herein contained shall prevent a seller
rebutting the prima facie case thus made by showing that his lower price or the
furnishing of services or facilities to any purchaser or purchasers was made in good
faith to meet an equally low price of a competitor ..... 38 Stat. 730 (1914), 15
U.S.C. § 13b (1958).
47. 295 F.2d at 498.
48. 348 S.W.2d 749 (Tenn. App. M.S. 1961).
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Tennessee had before it the issue of rights to the commercial usage of a
surname. Unlike the traditional version of this problem, here the com-
peting claims to "Julian," the complainant's surname, arose in the context
of an employment relationship governed by an agreement containing an
express provision limiting the employer-partnership's rights in the em-
ployee's surname.49 The complainant, dissatisfied with the mode and extent
of the partnerships use of his name, withdrew his services and served
timely notice under the agreement in order to terminate the partnership's
continued usage. Unable to prevail upon his employers, the complainant
filed suit, his original bill requesting a permanent injunction restraining
further use of his surname. From that injunction the partners appealed,
attacking the jurisdiction of the chancellor below on grounds of failure to
meet the jurisdictional amount required under Tennessee Code Annotated
section 16-603.
In affirming the chancellors decree, the court of appeals, finding the
injunction amply supported by evidence of violation of a valid contract,
addressed itself to the determination of whether the value of the pro-
tected rights were within the jurisdictional amount. In affirming, the
court found in this record adequate evidence that the value of the com-
plainant's surname was far in excess of the minimum jurisdictional sum.50
The court of appeals noted, in passing, that this result was congruent with
the settled doctrine in Tennessee which provides for injunctive relief to
prevent the wrongful use of an individual's surname.5 1
49. The early English cases dealt with competing claims to individual surnames in
two groupings. The first involved the rights to a surname arising from the sale of a
business. Cruttwell v. Lye, 17 Ves. 334, 34 Eng. Rep. 129 (Ch. 1810); Shackle v.
Baker, 14 Ves. 468, 33 Eng. Rep. 600 (Ch. 1808); Williams v. Williams, 2 Swanst.
253, 36 Eng. Rep. 612 (Ch. 1818).
The second and subsequently more important grouping involved the use of the name
of an established seller by a newly-entering competitor. Ordinarily the junior com-
peting seller had colorable claim to the identical surname. Croft v. Day, 7 Beav. 84,
49 Eng. Rep. 994 (Rolls 1843); Sykes v. Sykes, 3 B. & C. 541, 107 Eng. Rep. 834
(K.B. 1824); Burgess v. Burgess, 3 DeG, M. & G. 896, 43 Eng. Rep. 351 (Ch. 1853);
Turton v. Turton, 42 Ch. D. 128 (1889).
The use of an individual surname in firm and product designation continues as a
subject of litigation. See Putnam, The Deceptive Use of One's Own Name, 12 HA.nv.
L. REv. 243 (1898); Wigmore, Justice, Commercial Morality, and the Federal Supreme
Court, The Waterman Pen Case, 10 ILr.. L. REv. 178 (1915); See also Hunt Potato
Chip Co. v. Hunt, 340 Mass. 371, 164 N.E.2d 335 (1960); Libby, McNeill & Libby v.
Libby, 103 F. Supp. 968 (D.C. Mass. 1952); Gillette v. Gillette Safety Razor Co., 65
F.2d 266 (C.C.P.A. 1933).
50. At least two transactions were material. The court noted the testimony by one
partner that he executed a $5,000 note upon learning that he would be able to obtain
the complainant's name and services. In addition, the court referred to the com-
plainant's compensation for the use of his name and his services as an amount sub-
stantially in excess of the minimum jurisdictional amount.
51. Robinson v. Robinson's Inc., 9 Tenn. App. 103 (W.S. 1928); Robinson v. Storm,
103 Tenn. 40, 52 S.W. 880 (1899); M. M. Newcomer Co. v. Newcomer's New Store,
142 Tenn. 108, 217 S.W. 822 (1919).
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